The Challenges facing Developing Countries in their International Relations
5. The Third World and World Order in the Twenty-first Century: The Impact of Intrusive Regionalism
Amitav Acharya, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, Ontario
Abstract: A dominant perspective in international relations has argued that the end of the Cold War would unleash substantially greater regional disorder in the Third World. This presentation however, argues that regional order and disorder in the post-Cold War era depend on other factors besides the international distribution of power. The differential impact of the end of the Cold War on regional order in the Third World can be explained by the varied interplay of norms in the regions. Traditional norms of sovereignty and non-interference that always played a significant role in Third World regionalism are now under duress. The redefinition of these norms may be traced to the fact that some Westphalian norms have been internationally undermined in the post-Cold War era. The changing nexus of regionalism, sovereignty and security is likely to produce different regional orders across the Third World.
As part of the polarity-stability debate, various realist perspectives have argued that the end of the Cold War would precipitate greater regional instability in the Third World. This regional disorder would derive mainly from the lifting of the security umbrellas of the superpowers and associated problems of multipolarity and aspiring regional hegemonies. It is true that changes in the international distribution of power affect regional order in the Third World. Its effects, however, vary across regions, and depend on the changing interplay of norms of inter-state sovereignty.
In the Cold War era, regional order in the Third World was determined mainly by the internal security predicament of Third World states. Problems of weak statehood and regime legitimacy defined this security predicament (drawing on Ayoob, Buzan and others). Various regional orders in the Third World were driven by the same security concerns. Hence they were based on the norms of sovereignty and regime survival (and through this prism, the impact of superpower rivalry was also taken into consideration). The emphasis on the preservation of state sovereignty became a distinguishing feature of Third World regionalism. It is noteworthy that proposals at regionalism that challenged the sovereignty principle yielded few successes. Examples of such failed attempts include Nehru’s Pan-Asianism, Nasser’s Pan-Arabism, and Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism.
Within the sovereignty principle, the Third World found two alternative conceptualisations of regionalism that it could adopt. First, regionalism could be based on superpower patronage, and thereby manifested itself in Cold War alliances. Second and alternatively, it could aspire to regional autonomy. Regional organisations based on the second conceptualisation pursued three key norms – non-interference, pacific settlement of disputes directed towards the maintenance of territorial status quo, and ‘regional solutions to regional problems’. Countries that chose to preserve regional security under the umbrella of a superpower, soon became aware of the problems of such a strategy. They included the arbitrary and weak commitment of the superpowers and other adverse side effects of relying on external protection. But the second conceptualisation also did not go unchallenged. The challenges came not only from the superpower regional alliances, but also the more extreme version of regional autonomy i.e. a pan-nationalist version that preserved regional autonomy at the expense of non-interference and preservation of post-colonial territorial status quo.
Most regional experiments in the Third World were unable to reconcile these conflicting norms - ‘The best protection against outside interference came from pan-nationalist frameworks, but to rely on this could only mean compromising on non-interference and territorial status quo’. Usually, countries tended to opt for a weak regional order that protected their sovereignty, and thereby greatly reduced the efficacy and credibility of regional organisations that had started out with much broader aims.
A few parts of the Third World were able to escape the contradictions described above. Sub-regional groupings like the ASEAN and the GCC adopted the three norms but gave primacy to the goal of regime security. Non-interference here represented a commitment to mutual support against common internal threats. Politico-security concepts were devised to downplay the extent of the actual reliance of some members on bilateral military alliances with outside powers. These groupings demonstrated that regime security could serve as a powerful catalyst for regional security cooperation, even when inter-state disputes exist and there is no consensus against the nature of the external threat.
The end of the Cold War has disrupted the carefully struck balance between the three norms in the ASEAN and the GCC. The Third World has however, not fallen prey to the regional disorder and chaos that had been predicted by the realists. The differential response of various regions in reordering the norms that underlay their existence and working, determines the extent of regional order or disorder in the post-Cold War era.
The impact of superpower rivalry precipitated several changes in the existing international order that necessitated a redefinition of the security roles of regional organisations. It challenged existing regimes as a result of the unprecedented focus on issues of human rights and democratisation. It also created new regional threats necessitating regional solutions (e.g. the rise of regional hegemons and internal conflicts, accompanied by a strategy of selective engagement by the outside powers, particularly the US). The Westphalian pact struck by members of a region needed some redefinition.
The response of the Third World to these challenges has been varied. Some regions in the Third World have adapted to the new conditions by choosing a more ‘intrusive’ form of regionalism. This intrusive regionalism is based on the CSCE/OSCE model. The OSCE model, however, has its origins in a regional context of European integration i.e. a movement away from Westphalian sovereignty, with distinctive political roots, and a high level of institutionalisation. The presence of similar conditions to varying degrees in the Third World, explains the differential response. Latin America has moved closes to the intrusive regionalism, while the Asia Pacific has been the most reluctant to adopt a redefinition of the balance of norms.
In the course of discussion, it was highlighted that many of the new norms (such as humanitarian intervention) are contested, and do not represent a linear development. Further, taking the ASEAN as an example, would the resistance of some ASEAN members to the new norms of constructive intervention, not result in the very disappearance of the organisation itself? The speaker’s response was to cite the example of ‘the ASEAN way’ and its growing disjunction with global norms. ASEAN-led attempts at joint economic surveillance present an instance of a non-voluntary departure from sovereignty. Intrusive regionalism might disrupt the ASEAN, but it might also result in a new and more stable regional order with a base in the civil society.
The discussion also pointed to the strong normative assumptions of the enquiry. Counter to the emphasis on the three regional norms that is presented here, it could be argued that there exists some real disagreement on the issue of regionalism. In recognition of the divisive impact of deeper regionalism, a world order of bandwagons with the US (as opposed to regional orders) is just as plausible. The speaker recognised the normative basis of his enquiry. A part of the contribution of the work, however, lies in the methodological realm through the attempt to explain how regional orders may be explained through regional norms (as opposed to domestic norms and structural change). Further, some regional orders will be more stable than before, but others that fail to adapt are likely to be more unstable. But the increasing regionalisation of security and the differential responses to the new conditions, are likely to yield regional orders and security communities that are much more differentiated than in the Cold War era.
The rest of the seminar series:
Introduction
The Politics
of Aid and Conditionality by Stephen Jones
International Investment Treaties, Valpy Fitzgerald
Good governance and the MDBs, Christina
Biebesheimer
Global Governance and the Post
Washington Consensus, Richard Higgott
Intrusive Regionalism, Amitav Acharya
Regionalism in the Middle East, Louise Fawcett
Aiding Democracy Abroad: Lessons from the late
1980s-90s, Thomas Carothers
Developing Countries
and the International Financial Architecture, Ngaire Woods
Humanitarian Intervention, Thomas Weiss