By the time you read this, the Copenhagen climate conference will be underway. We do not know how it will end. Recent weeks have offered reasons for despair and optimism. The last few rounds of negotiations in Bangkok and Barcelona have led to much angst thanks to the realization that: (a) the political will for a legally binding agreement has dipped; (b) rich countries are trying to replace the Kyoto Protocol rather than commit actions under it; and (c) no mechanism for climate finance has yet emerged.
On the other hand, several countries (developed and developing) have offered to reduce carbon emissions (Brazil; European Union; Indonesia; Japan; Russia; South Korea; United States) or to cut down on carbon intensity (China; India). In November the Commonwealth Heads of Government also endorsed a proposal for a $10 billion fund to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change. Moreover, key leaders have announced their intention to attend the meetings, a sign that some kind of deal is likely.
The success or failure of Copenhagen will depend not only on the substance of the deal but on the spirit and message of the talks as well. Negotiators inside the Bella Center in Copenhagen will no doubt go down to the wire on commas and clauses. For the ordinary citizen, the legitimacy of any climate agreement will depend on answers to four questions.
1. Where will the deal get struck?
Delegations of 192 countries are meeting in Copenhagen but will they all count? Of course, no climate agreement will be effective if the biggest emitters do not take action. Seventeen economies account for more than 90% of current emissions. These economies met as the Major Economies Forum (MEF) in July and agreed to limit the rise in global average temperatures to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Then in September the G20 met in Pittsburgh and more recently, meetings between President Obama and President Hu have underlined the importance of the world’s two biggest emitters.
So, how important is universality in climate negotiations if the main players are able to work out a deal in allegedly more manageable and efficient forums?
If the objective is merely to secure a few commitments from each other so as to placate domestic constituencies, small groups might be sufficient. But there is no guarantee that the alternative forums will deliver outcomes that are any more credible than the meetings held under UN’s umbrella. The targets announced so far fall short of the emission cuts recommended by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Moreover, suggestions that only the big emitters need to come to a consensus ignore the other end of the equation, namely adaptation to climate change. In the absence of deep emission cuts, the poorest countries will have no option but to expend more of their energies and resources on facing the brunt of a warming climate. It is disingenuous to reduce their appeal for more action as simply a call for more aid. The legitimacy of the entire climate regime rests on how it accounts for the vast majority of the people who would be affected by climate change. There is a risk that Copenhagen might merely become a clearing house for a few bilateral deals among the major emitters. For the moment even larger developing countries are resisting such moves. But the temptation of ‘efficient’ negotiations in informal meetings and forums is not going to go away.
2. How will commitments be implemented?
The prospect that a Copenhagen deal will not be legally binding has raised legitimate questions about whether commitments will be implemented at all. There is, of course, pressure to convert political commitments into legally binding provisions within a few months after Copenhagen. But it is important to recognise that formal legal treaties vary in the degrees to which they promote compliance in practice. On financing and technology transfer, for instance, the UNFCCC uses phrases like ‘as appropriate’, ‘if necessary’, and ‘in so far as possible’. The Kyoto Protocol, which has a compliance mechanism, is also vulnerable to subjective interpretations of key terms like ‘demonstrable progress’ (see Lavanya Rajamani’s analysis of the tensions in existing treaties).
The other side of the compliance coin is enforcement. The Kyoto Protocol has not been tested yet on this key issue. If developed countries succeed in bypassing the Protocol, despite failures to abide by their commitments, what guarantee is there that a new protocol will have a credible enforcement mechanism? International regimes vary in their enforcement models in the degree of centralisation and decentralisation of adjudication and enforcement (see my paper with Ngaire Woods on lessons for climate governance). Poor countries might prefer centralised enforcement in light of the economic and political constraints in individually sanctioning bigger powers. But the main problem arises from the asymmetric nature of the commitments themselves. Whereas developed countries are meant to reduce their emissions, the Bali Action Plan conceives efforts by developing country parties as contingent on technology, financing and capacity building support. What sanctions can be applied for the non-delivery of such support?
3. Who will pay?
Climate finance will increasingly emerge as the lynchpin of the climate regime. So far, negotiations have resembled a poker game, with no party offering substantial contributions that would make a deal at Copenhagen and beyond effective. The scale of funding required is several times more than what is currently spent. The money will have to come from a mix of private and public sources. Moreover, the governance of climate finance will be crucial. As Kevin Watkins and I argue in a recent paper, a low carbon technology and finance facility will have to increase the scale of funding, offer flexible financing modalities, manage intellectual property and ensure that developing countries have balanced representation.
The danger is that a few countries will get to share the spoils of climate finance. Bilateral initiatives among major emitters are important, but they are not a substitute for multilateral funding mechanisms. Or else, other countries will fail to gain access to clean technologies. The result can only exacerbate already existing vast inequalities in access to energy and energy services. The other danger is in adaptation funding. It is increasingly argued that once the big emitters sort out their burden-sharing commitments, the poorest countries will be compensated for adaptation. But there is a history of unmet commitments in development assistance and even market-based mechanisms, such as the Adaptation Fund, have not disbursed any money yet. Copenhagen will have to make sure that a financing mechanism increases, rather than limits, access to funds for a majority of the parties.
4. How will firms and civil society respond?
Finally, any outcome at Copenhagen will be tested by the response of firms and ordinary citizens. Until 2008 large developing countries were rapidly investing in renewable energy. But the global economic crisis combined with the fall in conventional energy prices resulted in a drop in renewable energy investments in 2009. Moreover, uncertainty over the fate of the Kyoto Protocol has made investors in green industries in developing countries cautious about further investments. At the same time, concern over climate change has increased among ordinary people over the past decade, according to a BBC poll. So, people and firms are waiting for a clear signal from Copenhagen. If that signal does not emerge or is left too ambiguous, public support and private investment might dry up exactly when efforts need to be ramped up.
Climate negotiators and their political masters have a tough balancing act to perform: they have to act as agents representing the best interests of their citizens and countries; and they have to act as leaders to strike bold deals in the interest of global welfare. In short, they have to make Copenhagen count.
A list of GEG research papers, briefs and articles on climate change governance is available here.
December 7th, 2009 at 11:04 am
[...] Ghosh Making Copenhagen count the GEG blog 7 December [...]
December 7th, 2009 at 11:17 am
[...] on the spirit and message of the talks as well, writes Arunabha Ghosh in his latest GEG blog post Making Copenhagen count. Four big questions will dominate: Who participates in the deal? How will it be implemented? Who [...]
December 11th, 2009 at 12:06 am
Thank you for noting that the success of the Copenhagen conference will depend more on the spirit in which the messages are being delivered, as opposed to their substance. The need to lower greenhouse gas emissions globally is highly relevant, but in my opinion, it has always appeared in a more altruistic manner. Compliance from developing countries should not be dependent on technological, financial, or other forms of support from advanced economies. They are more vulnerable to the risks of climate change, hence should be made to understand the relevance of promoting a decarbonized environment. This sort of enlightenment would increase the likelihood of third-world countries in implementing their commitments. Also, sincerity (in formulating and implementing climate policies) amongst stakeholders would strongly reduce the huge cost of climate finance.
December 14th, 2009 at 6:51 am
Thanks for the posting. I think the article raised several key questions that need to be addressed. I think it’s impossible for all participates to reach an agreement. It might be viable to set different standards for different groups of countries. Also, it’s important for the top 17 emitters to work on a feasible and effective plan to lower the green house emission. Additionally, it’s very important to get the business involved, which is helpful for developing green technologies and provide green jobs.