Donor government aid policies are determined by a combination of competing forces within the international system as well as the domestic environment. For example, the majority of France’s bilateral aid has traditionally been allocated to countries in the ‘Priority Solidarity Zone’ which includes many former French colonies in Africa (OECD 2008). However, Mitterand’s socialist government was associated with a strong commitment to development orientated aid, including a 30 percent increase in aid to countries which were not associated with French imperialism (Lumsdaine 1993).
As with other foreign policies, domestic public opinion is an important factor influencing the ‘aid effort’ of donor governments (Mc Donnell et al. 2003). Thus, in predicting how the financial crisis will impact on donor commitment to the UN’s 0.7% of GNI aid target, it is important to consider variation in public attitudes to aid across the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member states.
Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) used a hierarchical model to demonstrate that the public’s foreign policy preferences are vertically constrained. In other words, core values structure normative postures about government behaviour which in turn determines responses to specific foreign policy issues. As such, the old adage that ‘public support for aid is a mile wide and an inch deep’ should not be applied as a constant across all aid donor countries.
While it is unlikely that public support for aid will increase as a result of the financial crisis, there may be significant cross-national variation between support remaining reasonably stable and support declining. Three variables can inform us about how national electorates will likely respond to the current financial crisis and looming global recession. These are:
1. The extent to which countries have socialist (versus liberal and conservative) welfare state attributes according to Esping-Andersen’s typologies (Noël and Thérien 1995);
2. The level of political trust or political capital within countries; and
3. The extent to which government aid is given out of altruistic motives versus the enlightened self-interest of the donor
By looking at how these three variables interact across the DAC member states, one could speculate that support for aid in the Scandinavian countries is likely to remain stable despite the current financial crisis. In Norway, Denmark and Sweden, inequality is addressed via the welfare state and a broad spectrum of society from conservative Christian groups to leftist activist groups support aid for altruistic reasons (Bøås 2002). Conversely in Japan, there isn’t a strong tradition of redistribution. Furthermore, since Japan’s ‘peace constitution’ inhibits the pursuit of foreign policy strategies via military means (Katada 2001), aid is used to fulfil the country’s trade, diplomacy and security goals. Therefore, although Japanese support for aid began declining in the 1990s (due to Japan’s sluggish economic conditions), it is likely to drop further as a consequence of the current financial crisis.
In 2003 Japan gave 5 percent of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to basic social services (including basic education, basic health, and aid to water supply and sanitation with a poverty focus) compared with Ireland’s 30.6 percent of ODA (United Nations Environment Programme 2008). However, despite the altruistic nature of Irish aid, political trust in Ireland is low, as it is in Italy (TNS Opinion & Social 2007a; b). As such, the public’s response to the financial crisis has already pressured these governments to cut future aid spending commitments (Aslam 2008; Oxfam Ireland 2008). Chong and Gradstein (2006) found that public support for aid was negatively correlated with donor government corruption and positively correlated with ‘satisfaction with people in office’ and ‘confidence in the government’. Hetherington (2005) has explained that when it comes to foreign aid, because tax payers do not see any of the benefits of their sacrifice, the public’s acceptance of the ‘investment risk’ associated with delivering aid in far away countries is significantly determined by their level of political trust. Given that the recent financial sector bailout has resulted in demands for greater government accountability with public finance, political trust is even more important at present for predicting public support for aid.
Refer to the table below for a summary of countries to watch vis-à-vis public support for aid and aid effort:
|
Variable |
Implication |
Public Response during crisis |
Countries to watch |
|
Strong socialist welfare state institutions |
Redistribution and social justice principles have been established |
Support remains stable |
Norway, Denmark, Sweden |
|
Domestic needs are being addressed |
|||
|
Low level of political trust |
Development assistance perceived as a ‘high risk gamble’ (heightened demand for public finance accountability due to financial sector bailout) |
Support declines |
Japan, Italy, US, Ireland, UK, Portugal, France |
|
Aid sold to the public as being in the national interest (versus solidarity with the working poor) |
Security, trade, illegal migration and diplomatic interests prioritised over poverty reduction |
Support for development assistance declines but support for security aid remains stable |
US, Australia, Canada, Japan |
References
Aslam, A. 2008. Poor Sidelined in Rush to Contain Financial Crisis, October 14 (Inter Press Service). Washington DC: ActionAid. http://www.actionaidusa.org/news/related/intl_policy/poor_sidelined_in_rush_to_contain_financial_crisis/ (accessed November 11).
Bøås, M. 2002. Public attitudes to aid in Norway and Japan. Working Paper Nr. 2002/03. Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo.
Chong, A. and M. Gradstein. 2006. Who’s Afraid of Foreign Aid? The Donor’s Perspective. CESifo Working Paper No. 1833.
Hetherington, M.J. 2005. Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism. Woodstock, Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.
Hurwitz, J. and M. Peffley. 1987. How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model. The American Political Science Review 81: 1099-1120.
Katada, S.N. 2001. Why did Japan suspend foreign aid to China? Japan’s foreign aid decision-making and sources of aid sanction. Social Science Japan Journal 4: 39-58.
Lumsdaine, D.H. 1993. Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Mc Donnell, I., H.-B. Solignac Lecomte and L. Wegimont eds. 2003. Public Opinion and the Fight Against Poverty. Paris: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Noël, A. and J.-P. Thérien. 1995. From Domestic to International Justice – the Welfare-State and Foreign-Aid. International Organization 49: 523-553.
OECD. 2008. France: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Oxfam Ireland. 2008. Oxfam Ireland expresses disappointment at government aid cut. http://www.oxfamireland.org/news/releases/2008/07-08.shtml (accessed November 11, 2008).
TNS Opinion & Social. 2007a. National Report Executive Summary: Ireland. In Eurobarometer 67. European Commission.
—. 2007b. National Report Executive Summary: Italy. In Eurobarometer 67. European Commission.
United Nations Environment Programme. 2008. Globalis (Global Virtual University). http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu/indicator_detail.cfm?country=IE&indicatorid=106 (accessed November 11).
